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ABSTRACT
Utilizing a model in which individuals search among lotteries
on likely success at different jobs, this paper analyzes both the
search decision when unemployed and the implications of the sorting
process. The model correctly predicts both the direction and con-
vexity of the age-unemployment relationship and the impact of ex-
perience on turnover and wages. Actions taken when unemployed have
an important impact on equilibrium turnover rates, unemployment
rates, and the work history of the pool of unemployed. The sorting
model is used to analyze racial differences in youth unemployment






At the timeofentry into the labor market, few individuals know
the type of job for which tl-Ev are best suited. This uncertainty leads
to a process of experimentation in which individuals and employers learn
about the appropriateness of the job—individual inatchup and terminate
this relationship if it is not desirable. The process by which individ-
uals engage in lotteries on appropriate matchups will be referred
to in this paper as worker sorting. Different aspects of this
process have been considered under various headings, such as job shopping,
1
job matching, and adaptive models of job choice.
The purpose of this essay is to provide a general framework for
analyzing the implications of worker sorting for patterns of turnover,
unemployment, and wage growth. I will consequently not be primarily con-
cerned with the specific features of the sorting process, but will focus
instead on the broader ramifications of sorting for worker mobility.
While it will be shown that most of the established empirical patterns
of labor mobility are consistent with the sorting model, the framework
is not inconsistent with more traditional analyses of mobility, which
often contribute to the motivation of the economic processes underlying
sorting behavior.2
1Although there is some overlap in the issues considered, the
following division is representative. See Johnson (1978) and Viscusi
(forthcoming—c) for job shopping models, Mortensen (1975, 1978), Becker
(1974), Jovanovic (1977), and Mincer and Jovanovic (1979) for matching
models, and Viscusi (1979, forthcoming—a,b) for adaptive control models.
ore specifically, the analytic foundation of the process leading to
sorting is based in part on the insights in the human capital literature,
most particularly those regarding specific human capital. See Becker (1964),
Lazear (1976), Leighton and Mincer (forthcoming), Mincer (1974), Mincer and
Jovanovic (1979), 01 (1962), Parsons (1972), Pencavel (1962), and Rosen (1972).—2—
Section II analyzes the process of job search in which individuals
do not search among alternative wage offers but instead confront different
lotteries on whether or not a job matchup will be successful. The ram—
ifications of this soriii. pLocess for aggregative patterns of unemployment
and turnover are the subjedt of Section III. Special attention is devoted
to the implications of the model for the unemployment patterns of black
youths and low income workers. Section IV analyzes the impact of experience
at the firm on worker separations, quits, layoffs, and wage levels, while
Section V considers the age—unemployment relationship. A major strength
of the sorting theory is that it correctly predicts both the observed
direction of these relationships and the empirically observed convexity.3
II. Mobility Lotteries and Optimal Search Procedures
Consider an employment situation in which an individual can reside
in one of three possible states S, where the superscript i will be used
throughout to refer to the individual's present state. State 1 represents
a successful job match, represents an unsuccessful job match, andS3
is unemployment.4 Let the periods remaining in the worker's choice problem
3See especially Leighton and Mincer (forthcoming) for the most com-
prehensive analysis of the empirical aspects to be considered. Their
analysis also includes a discussion of the importance of sorting and
other conceptual underpinnings of labor mobility. Also pertinent are
the other papers included in Freeman and Wise (forthcoming).
Following Burdett and Mortensen(1978), one can also develop the
model in terms of groups of states S1 and S2 for successful and unsuc—
cessful matches across a heterogeneous set of jobs.—3—
be indicated by subscripts. With n periods ].eft, the employment transition
probabilities are given by P, so that
Ib 0 1—bI n n
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where the ij'th element represents the transition from S1 to S3 with n
periods remaining. Each of these transition probabilities can assume
values in [0,1], but the rows must sum to 1.
Individuals do not move between successful and unsuccessful job
matches without searching for another job while in S3.5 The probability
of termination of a successful job match is assumed to be less than for
an unsuccessful match, so that
6 b >c U fl
50n—the—jobsearch leading to job changes without intervening unemploy-
ment, as in Burdett (1978), is excluded. For short periods, the necessity
of an intervening spell of employment does not provide too dissimilar results.
With minor amendments, the model also can include labor force dropouts along
the lines of Burdett and Mortensen (1979) or Toikka (1976). Doing so would
require the addition of a fourth state.
assumption can be derived rigorously as in Mortensen (1975, 1978),
Jovanovic (1977), and Viscusi (forthcoming—a). Cyclical factors and a
change in the locale of one's spouse's job are among the influences that
lead to terminationofsuccessful matches.—4—
The specific economic processes leading to worker turnover from the two
employment states need not be considered explicitly for the purposes of
cs analysis. Cyclical factors, random events that lead the orker to
move, and decisions by employers and workers to terminate unsuccessful
matchups are among the determinants of these probabilities.
Unemployed individuals have a probability f of finding an acceptable
job, where S is the conditional probability of a successful job match
given that the offer is acceptable. More specifically, the individual
job searth will take the form of individuals searching not among
alternative wage offers, but rather lotteries on successful and unsuccess-
ful job outcomes with a probability z of S1 and (l—z) of S2. Let the
density function of possible success probabilities with n periods remain-
ing be g(z). If z IS the lowest probability ofS acceptable to the
worker, the probability f of finding a job in that period is given by
1
(1) f = g(x) dx







The transition probability sf fromS3 to S1 can be obtained
using equations 1 and 2, and is—5—
1
sf=Ixg(x)dx
Similarly, the transition probability (l—s)f from S3 to S2 is
(1_s)f =1(l—x)g(x)dx
and the value (i—f) for remaining in S3 is
(l—f)
=fg(x)dx
Highervalues of Zincreasethe probability of remaining unemployed
and decrease both probabilities of employment since





Residencein each state S1 with n periods remaining has an associated
immediatepayoff u1. Inaddition, there is the discounted present value
V_1 ofstarting in that state in thenext period. Aninterest rate r
hasan associated discount factor (l+r), which will be indicated by 8.—6—
i i
Entry into a particular S has an associated payoff u+ .The
relative attractiveness of the states is such that
(3) u1 + >u3+ >+
n n—i n n—i n n—i
7
for all n.
The recursive solution to the worker's dynamic programming problem
in each state is
V1b Eu1 + V1 ]+(1—b )[u3 + ] nnfl n—i 11n n—i
2 2 2 3 3 V =c[u +V ]+(i—c)[u +V ], nnfl n—i n n n—i
and
(4) V3 =sf [u1 ÷ ]+(i-s )f [u2 + I nnil n n—i n n n n—i
+ (i-f) [u ÷
Any choices in the three states with n periods left aremade with respect
to the predetermined optimal values V1.8
7A sufficient, but not necessary condition for this to be true is
thatu1>u3>u2,forall n.
8To av:id co:plicating the notation further, all values of V in
subsequent periods are assumed to be their optituai valuesdetermined
by backward induction.—7—
The worker in S3 receives a job offer at random from the distribution
characterized by g(z). Instead of receiving a wage offer, he learns the
probability z that the job match will be successful. The :.ly choice
variable is whether or not to accept the job. Thus the worker picks his
reservation probability of success z in each period. Subsequent lotteries
will be generated from a perhaps different distribution so that g_1(z)
need not be identical to g(z). However, the values of g in each period
are assumed to be independent of the worker's previous experiences, ruling
out learning effects and recall of a previous of fer.9
Two possible variants of sorting can be incorporated in this model.
First, the worker who accepts a job mayrealizeimmediately whether S'
prevails so that his job characteristics satisfy u >uand b >cn.
Alternatively, the rewards in S1 and S2 maybeindistinguishable
(u =u)
so that the worker and employer are not immediately aware of
the outcome.1° The appropriateness of the match is, however, discovered
on a probabilistic basis over time, leading to a higher termination
probability for S2 than S1. For concreteness, the exposition will be in
terms of the first of these situations.
Consider a worker in S3 with n periods remaining. The optimal
decisions in other states at that time are not matters of concern. More-
over, all that must be known about subsequent decisions is that they are
The parallel of the format with wage search models from a known
distribution is quite close. See the survey by Lippman and McCall (1976).
model developed along these lines must have associated transition
probabilities that satisfy equation 3.—8—
made optimally, so that the V1 terms in equation 4 assume their maximum





(5) z{[u' ÷ —[u2+ V2 J} =[u+ -[u2+
The worker sets the value of z so that the product of the reservation
success probability and the net gain from being in S1 instead of S2
equals the net difference in the value of being unemployed over the value
of an unsuccessful job outcome. The optimal value of z depends only on
the values of being in each state. It is independent of the shape of the
(Z) distribution, although it does depend on subsequent values of g.
The worker's choice of z responds in the expected fashion to changes
i
in u ,since n
3z
<0, <0,and >0.
au au n n n
Increases in the value of either employed state lower the reservation
acceptance probability, while increases in the unemployment state payoff
make the worker more selective as he raises zn
See Howard (1971) for a detailed motivation of optimization
procedures within the context of Markov decision models.—9—
The role of the mobility lottery distribution can be seen by examining
the role of whereis some parameter. Only the V31 term in
equation 5 depends on g1(z, ),sothat
av3 n .n-l
sign =sign
From the counterpart of equation 5 for n—i periods left, we know that
is independent of g1(z, )sothat need not be written as
a function of the parameteri that will be used to alter g1(z,).
Using equation 4, V1 can be formulated as
V_1 = g_1(x, dx][u1 + +
f(l-x)g1(x, )dx][u14-v_2] ÷
p)dx] [u1 + V2]
Differentiating with respect toi ,oneobtains
(6) ={ [u11+ 8V12] -[u_
+,By22]
}'xg(x,)dx
+ {[u1 + -[u1÷ g_(x, )dx
where the first term in braces is positive and the second is negative.
Consider a shift in g1 distribution toward the upper tail so that
both of the terms are positive. This would occur if, for example,
g_1(x )shiftedto the right by some constant amount. The first—10—
derivative term Is the Increased probability ofa successful job out-
come, s1f1, from a marginal increase in .Thisvalue is weighted
by the net advantage of residence in S1 over S2. The second drivative
term is the increase in the probability of findinga job, f1, weighted
2 3 by the (negative) difference between the values of states S and S.If
both of the terms are positive, 2willbe an increasing function of
pifthe value of the increased probability of a successfuljob match
offsets the drop in utility associated with the increased chanceof finding
a job that is not a successful match.
Whether one considers changes in the distribution ofjob offers,
payoffs, or other parameters of the job choice problem,any effect that
alters z will influence both the probability of findinga job f and
the conditional probability of a successful job outcome inopposite
fashion. Upon differentiation of equations 1 and 2,one obtains
(7) =— g(z)<0
and
3$ g (z )[—z f + xg (x)dx] (8)nnn nn z n >0 3zn
These equations will be utilized in Section III to assess whether different
groups' unemployment experiences are attributable to differences injob
offer distribution or differences in other parameters of the decision
problem.—11—
III. Determinants of Equilibrium Outcomes
A. Steady State Frequencies
Suppose that '.h- ansition matrix P for a labor market





which is the same as P except that the period subscripts have been
dropped assuming that the group's average behavior is time—invariant.
The equilibrium proportions a. of the group in each of the states S1
are given by
(9) = sf(l—c)




sf(l—c)+ (l—s)f(l—b) + (l—b)(l—c)
and
— (l—b)(l—c)
a3 —sf(l—c)+ (l—s)f(l—b) + (l—b)(l—c)
The nature in which the group proportions depend on the different
parameters y (where y includes s,f,b, and c) is sunimarized inTable I.
Groups with higher conditional probabilities of success s will exhibit
greater concentrations inS1 and lower concentrations in S2 and S3.
Increasing the probability f of finding an acceptable job reduces the
unemployment rate and increases both employmentstatefrequencies. Finally,—12--
Table I
Summary of aa.IyEffects
y a1 a2 a3
S +- -
f + + -
b +- -
C- +-—13—
increases in b and c raise the values ofa1 and a2, respectively, while
decreasing all other a.'s.
3.
Whatis particularly striking about the results is that a difference
in a parameter for one of the states has widespread ramifications for the
group's labor mobility patterns. Consider two groups of workers that
differ only in that one group has a lower conditional probability of
success 12 As these individuals leave the ranks of the unemployed,
they will tend to be concentrated in unsuccessful job matches in S2.
These jobs are associated with higher turnover rates, which in turn
leads to an increase in the level of unemployment a3 even though both
groups were assumed to have the same probability f of finding an accept-
able job once employed.
This interdependence is reflected in the characterizations in the
literature on the secondary labor market and individuals in dead—end jobs.13
There is a strong correlation among high turnover, low wage jobs, and
unemployment rates. As the sorting models indicate, this correlation
need not be attributable to Institutional factors or labor market discrimination
once employed, but may be due to the dynamics of the mobility process, and,
more specifically, to differences in groups' job search activities. This matter
will be explored in greater detail in Section III.C.
'2Other things equal, a lower z is required to lower s and an
increase in f will occur as well. Te analysis here assumes that s
is the only difference in behavior. The joint variation of s and f is
analyzed below.
'3For detailed discussion along these lines, see Doeringer and
Piore (1971) and Hall (1972).—14—
B. Turnover Histories and the Quality of the Workforce
The nature of the interdependerce in the labor mobility process is
Lorcefully illustrated by the work histories associated with different
labor force groups. SInce there is greater turnover from S2, oneVs
intuition might suggest that S3 would eventually consist largely of
individuals with unsuccessful job histories. To assess whether this is
the case, suppose that the transition matrix P is time—invariant and
* thatthe average quality Q of any group of workers is the ratio of the
proportion in that group who are successfully matched (i.e., those in
S') to the proportion who are unsuccessfully matched (i.e., those in S2).
The average quality of the inf low of workers from to new jobs is always
s/(l—s) since the fraction s will always be in S1 and (l—s) will enter
*
Nowconsider the equilibrium Q of the workers leaving their jobs in any
period. If the total population of workers is N, then the number of suc-
cessfully matched workers entering S3 in any period is Na1(l—b), while
the corresponding number of unsuccessful entrants to S3 is Na2(l—c).




as one can verify by substituting for a1 and a2 from equations 9 and 10.
Anyvalueof s will yield an equilibrium quality of workers that
is the same for new hires, those entering the ranks of the unemployed,—15—
14 * andthe stock of unemployed. Moreover, the value of Q depends only
on s, the conditional probability of success for acceptable jobs. Labor
market groups with lower values of s generated during the job search
process will consequently be associated with more turnover from unsuccess-
ful job matches and a stock of unemployed who were unsuccessfully matched
on their previous jobs. For the equilibrium values of the labor mobility
process, there is not simply some positive correlation among these values.
*
Rather,all of the Q values are identical and dependent only on s.
'C. Application to Black—White Youth Unemployment Differences
The sorting model can be profitably applied to the analysis of a
particularly salient problem, the wide discrepancy between rates of unemploy-
ment for black and white youths. Despite slight differences in emphasis in
various studies, the general consensus is that, while blacks have a some-
what lower probability of finding a job once unemployed, the dominant cause
of the unemployment discrepancy is that young blacks exhibit much higher
rates of turnover.
Although this problem is manifested through departures from employment
(S1 and S2), the source of the discrepancymay not be due to any aspect of
the functioning of the employment process. Rather differences while unemployed
in the nature of the search strategies can generate observed differences in
1 2
employment even if the transition probabilities while in S and S are
identical for both groups.
14 3 * 3 If exits from S are random and the Q fo the outflow from S
and for the inflow are identical, the..1value of Q for the preceding *
jobheld by the stock of workers in S will also have the same equilibrium Q—16—
More specifically, suppose that some economic factors lead blacks
to be less selective in their search so that they adopt a lower z. One
such influence may be a lower u3 value because remaining unemployed may
-belessdesirable ror ackyouths. The reduced z will lead
blacks to be matched less successfully to jobs in S2from which they will
exhibit higher turnover and become unemployed.
An important issue is whether the observed racial differences can
be possibly attributed solely to exogenous factors that affect the choice
z. First, it should be noted that the values of b and c maydifferby
race, so that lower levels of z and the associated lower values of s n n
need not be the cause of the observed patterns, though they are consistent
with the data. Second, if blacks do have lower z values, one can deter—
n
mine whether their mobility lottery offer distributions are identical
to those of whites. Since 3f/Dz is negative, a lower s (due to a
lower z) for blacks must be accompanied by a higher job finding rate
f if the distribution g(z) is identical across races. Since unemployed
blacks have slightly lower probabilities of finding jobs, if lower s
values do indeed contribute to the observed mobility patterns, then
blacks must also have different g(z) distributions with smaller upper
right tails.15
Differences in groups' choices of zn has an additional ramification
as well. Suppose that economic factors associated with the disadvantaged
- 15 . . .. Fora discussion of the empirical differences in the f values
for black and white youths and the other patterns considered here,
see Leighton and Mincer (forthcoming), the other papers in Freeman
and Wise (forthcoming), and Flanagan (1978).—17—
status of a labor force group have led them to lower their z values
for the mobility lottery search process. Then that group's job finding
rate will be raised so that examination of exits from unemployment for
these individuals will yield an overly optimistic portrayal of the
functioning of the labor market for the unemployed, while at the same
time leading to greater turnover (since as/az >0)that suggests that
the problem is an intrinsic instability of the nature of jobs. Thus,
the endogeneity of mobility decisions may mask important differences in
the behavior of the unemployed. Moreover, group differences in search
strategies will lead to different turnover propensities that one might
attribute incorrectly to the functioning of the employment process rather
than individual search decisions. Both the locus and cause of labor
mobility differences may be misunderstood.
IV. On—the—Job Experience and Labor Mobility
A central, and perhaps most important, determinant of empirically
observed patterns of labor mobility is the years of experience the worker
has had with his present employer. Firm—specific experience has a
negative influence on overall job separations, quits, and layoffs, and
a positive effect on worker earnings.16 The economic motivations for
these effects Include the role of specific human capital formation,
which enhances the employee's attractiveness to the firm.Suchconcerns
are implicit in the models developed here since they contribute to the
higher termination rate of unsuccessful matches.
16See, for example, Becker(1964),Jovanovic (1977), Lazear (1976),
Leighton and Mincer (forthcoming), Mincer (1974), Mincer and Jovanovic
(1979), Mortensen (1978), 01 (1962), Pencavel (1972), Rosen (1972), and
Viscusi (1979, forthconiug-a).—18—
The focus of this section is not on the economic underpinnings of
the probabilitistic structure of the mobility patterns analyzed in
Sections II and III. Rather I will attempt to assess whether the rather
unrestrictive stochastic structures described previously are consistent
with empirical observations. Both the first and second derivatives of
the relationship between firm—specific experience and the aforementioned
variables will be matters of concern.
Let t indicate the years of the worker's experience at the firm.
Then the probability P(S11t) that the worker is matched successfully in
S1 given tyears of experience is given by












The strong correlation between specific experience and successful job
matches is reflected in the limiting result that
limit P(S'It) =1,
sinceb >c.In contrast, from the earlier asymptotic results, we know




The superior empirical performance of specific experience (or tenure)
variables over that of age variables is not unexpected since large values
of experience are quite accurate predictors of successful job matches,
which, in the context of the sorting models, are the key determinants of
mobility.
The impact of t on mobility patterns depends on how it alters the
value of the conditional probability P(S'It))7 Logarithmic differentiation
of equation 11 yields
(12)ap(S11t)—[1+ (c)t]_2(C)t,fl(C) >
and
c 2 ct ct 2 [2n()) [(i-)
—l1(t)
(13) = u <0
at2 [+ (C)t)3
The relation between the conditional probability of a successful job match
is positive, but P(S'It) increases at a diminishing rate.
The relations in equations 12 and 13 provide all of the information
required to assess the impact of specific experience within the context
of the sorting models. Let P(Sep IS') indicate the separation probability
for a worker in state 1. By our earlier assumption,
P(SepIS1) =(1—b)<p(SepjS2) =(1—c)
The probability of a separation for a worker with experience t is
a conditional weighted average of the probabilities for each state, so
17Since P(S21t) = 1—p(S'It),this information is all that is





P(Seplt) =P(SepjS2)+ p(S11t)[P(SepIS1) —'(SepS2))





As illustrated in Figure I, the sorting model predicts a convex
negative relationship between the probability of separation and firm—
specific experience t. The limiting value of the separation probability
is the turnover rate (1—b) forS1. The initial separation probability
for new hires is an average of the separation rates for each state, with
the probability of a successful job match being the weight. More specif-
ically, the initial separation value is s(1—b) + (l—s)(l—c).
If the composition of separations in the two states is not too
similar, then one will also have a relationship between worker quits





181n most analyses of the matching process as in empirical work,
the distinction between quits and involuntary terminations is somewhat









With these stipulations one can derive a similar negative, convex relation
between t and both quits and layoffs.
In addition to generatinc predictions regarding worker turnover
propensities, the sorting model can also be used to analyze the earnings—
experience relationship. Let the state rewards u1 be wage levels for S'
and S2 and let (t) be the expected wage rate with t years of firm—specific
experience.
Following a procedure similar to that employed for separations, one
obtains the result that
— 2 1 1 2 u(t) =u+ P(St)[u—u




u(t) a P(S It)[Ul—2j<
t
at
Figure II sketches the positive, concave functional relationship between
iandt. The value of istartsat su1' + (l—s)u2 and approaches a limiting
value of u1.
What is particularly striking about all of these results is that
the sorting model involves a rather simple probabilistic structure and
that no restrictive assumptions about the magnitude of different prob-
abilities were made. Nevertheless, the sorting models correctly predicted
both the direction arid convexity of the relationship between firm—specific
experiences and both wages andturnover)9
19me direction and convexity of these relations is examined most












V. Worker Age and Unemployment
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of unemployment patterns
is that youth uncm'.r-nt are considerably higher than those of
their older counterparts. .A major source of this difference is that
older workers have more on—the—job experience, are more likely to be
matched appropriately to jobs, and will have lower turnover rates,
thus entering the ranks of the unemployed less frequently.2° The
analysis here will abstract from such age—related effects and will focus
on the impact of age per se on unemployment.
Consider the following merged mobility transition matrix,
N
1±
whereS1 is employment, S2 is unemployment, f is still the probability
of finding a job, q is the probability that one will not leave the job,
and q >f.21New labor force entrants are assumed to enter the labor force inS2.
22
Their age n reflects the number of periods they have been in the labor force.
2O an empirical basis, these influences are probably best reflected
in the firm—specific experience (or tenure) variables, as the analysis in
Section IV would suggest.
b equals c in the larger version of the model, the merged Markov
process involves no loss in generality. Otherwise, the restriction to
two—states can be viewed as a simplification. Analysis of 3—state models
is too complex to yield general closed—form solutions, such as that in
equation 14, once one leaves the realm of numerical examples.
format also accords with usual empirical procedures, which
typically set the overall experience measure equal to Age—Years of
Schooling —6.—23--
The matter of interest is the nature of the conditional probability
of unemployment, given the worker's age, or P(S21n). Using the z—trans—
form analysis described in Howard (1971), one can calculate the closed
form expression for this value as
(14) P(s2In) = + (q_f)fl tl+q1
The first bracketed term is the steady state probability that the worker
will be in S2. The final terms in this expression are associated with
the impact of n on P(S21n)and have a limiting value of 0.




32(s2In) =l+f-q'(q [th(q-f)]2 >0
As illustrated in Figure III, the probability of unemployment diminishes
23
at a decreasing rate with respect to age, as is found empirically.
VI. Conclusion
The sorting models of labor mobility introduced the process of
mobility lottery search into the analysis of unemployment and assessed
its implications for subsequent worker actions. With relatively minimal
assumptions concerning relative empirical magnitudes, these simple models
correctly predict both the direction and convexity of the age—unemployment










relation as well as the impact of enterprise—specific experience on
wages and various turnover measures.
Application of the sorting framework to observed mobility patterns
suggests that the .fthe mobility lottery decision may lead
to turnover differences that are incorrectly attributed to employment
policies and unemployment patterns that disguise important group dif-
ferences in the nature of unemployment. The theory also implies that
differences in black—white unemployment and turnover cannot be simply
due to less selective search policies by blacks. If blacks do indeed
have lower reservation probabilities for acceptable job matches, then
their opportunities must also differ from those of whites.—25—
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